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Introduction: Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) alleviates emotional distress in mental
health settings, but has only modest effects in cardiac patients. Metacognitive therapy
(MCT) also alleviates depression and anxiety in mental health settings and is in its initial
stages of evaluation for cardiac patients.
Aim: Our objective is to compare how CBT and MCT models conceptualize cardiac
patients’ distress, and to explore why CBT has had limited benefit for cardiac patients
and whether MCT has the potential to be more efficacious.
Method: Forty-nine cardiac rehabilitation patients, who screened positively for
anxiety and/or depression, provided semi-structured interviews. We analyzed transcripts
qualitatively to explore the “fit” of patients’ accounts of their distress with the main
elements of cognitive behavioral and metacognitive theories. Four illustrative cases,
representative of the diverse presentations in the broader sample, were analyzed in detail
and are presented here.
Results: Conceptualizing patients’ distress from the perspective of CBT involved
applying many distinct categories to describe specific details of patients’ talk, particularly
the diversity of their concerns and themultiple types of cognitive distortion. It also required
distinction between realistic and unrealistic thoughts, which was difficult when thoughts
were associated with the risk or consequences of cardiac events. From the perspective
of MCT a single category—perseverative negative thinking—was sufficient to understand
all this talk, regardless of whether it indicated realistic or unrealistic thoughts, and could
also be applied to some talk that did not seem relevant from a CBT perspective.
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Discussion: Conceptualizing distress from the perspective of CBT presents multiple,
diverse therapeutic targets, not all of which a time-limited therapy would be able to
address. Given the difficulty of identifying them as unrealistic or not, thoughts about
disease, death or disability may not be amenable to classic CBT techniques such
as reality testing. MCT proved more parsimonious and, because it did not distinguish
between realistic and unrealistic thoughts, might prove a better fit to emotional distress
in cardiac patients.
Keywords: Cognitive behavioral therapy, metacognitive therapy, coronary heart disease, depression, anxiety,
qualitative
INTRODUCTION
Depression and anxiety are problems commonly associated with
cardiovascular disease. A meta-analysis found that generalized
anxiety disorder and panic disorder are over twice as prevalent
in coronary heart disease (CHD) patients than in the general
population, and are comorbid with depressive disorders in
approximately 50% of cases, a rate of comorbidity that is similar
to community and psychiatric samples (Tully et al., 2016).
Reviews of studies of depression in patients with myocardial
infarction (MI) found that 20% of patients from eight studies
that used structured clinical interviews reached criteria for
major depression, and 14 studies that used validated self-report
measures identified depression in 40% of MI patients (Carney
and Freedland, 2003; Thombs et al., 2006). Emotional distress in
this population is linked to poorer quality of life, increased risk of
future cardiac events and mortality, increased use of healthcare,
and poorer treatment adherence (Frasure-Smith et al., 2000; Bush
et al., 2001; Lespérance et al., 2002; Gehi et al., 2005; Goyal et al.,
2005; Carney et al., 2008; Yohannes et al., 2010; Dickens et al.,
2012; Müller et al., 2012; Tully et al., 2016).
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is widely recommended
to treat anxiety and depression (Ballenger et al., 2001; Allgulander
et al., 2003; American Psychiatric Association, 2010; National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2011, 2016; Bandelow
et al., 2014), including in cardiac patients (Lichtman et al., 2008;
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2009; Heart
Foundation, 2012; Irish Association of Cardiac Rehabilitation,
2013). Its underpinning theory (Table 1) states that: (i)
patients experience negative automatic thoughts (NATs) about
themselves, the world and the future, which can be triggered
by events such as an MI; (ii) NATs reflect patients’ negative
beliefs about themselves and the world around them (these
can indicate deeply entrenched “core beliefs,” or “schemas,” and
“intermediate beliefs,” which are more malleable assumptions,
attitudes and rules); (iii) cognitive distortions maintain NATs
and negative beliefs (Beck, 1964a,b, 1976). CBT therapists help
Abbreviations: CABG, Coronary artery bypass graft; CAS, Cognitive attentional
syndrome; CBT, Cognitive behavioral therapy; CHD, Coronary heart disease;
CR, Cardiac rehabilitation; HADS, Hospital anxiety and depression scale; IES-
R, Impact of event scale—revised; MCT, Metacognitive therapy; MI, Myocardial
infarction; NAT, Negative automatic thought; NICE, National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence; RCT, Randomized controlled trial.
patients to identify and modify NATs and negative beliefs,
typically by challenging patients’ beliefs in the accuracy of their
thoughts, a process termed “cognitive challenging” or “reality
testing” (Beck, 1964a,b, 1976; Beck et al., 1979; Beck and Emery,
1985). Since its inception, CBT theory has been extended to
incorporate maladaptive behaviors, including avoidance and
reassurance seeking, and heightened attention, for example to
bodily symptoms (Table 1) (Clarke and Beck, 2010; Beck, 2011;
Beck and Haigh, 2014).
In mental health populations, meta-analyses show that CBT
is an efficacious treatment for anxiety and depression when
compared to wait-list or a range of comparison conditions, with
medium effect sizes of 0.73 and 0.71, respectively (Hofmann
and Smits, 2008; Cuijpers et al., 2013). By contrast, meta-
analyses of CBT-based interventions in cardiac patients have
been disappointing (Linden, 2013). When compared to usual
care or comparison conditions, including physical exercise or
educational interventions, effect sizes have ranged from 0.12
to 0.44 (Welton et al., 2009; Dickens et al., 2013; Rutledge
et al., 2013; Jeyanantham et al., 2017; Reavell et al., 2018).
A recently updated Cochrane review assessed the efficacy of
psychological interventions in CHD patients compared with
usual care (Richards et al., 2017). Although this review did
not report effects for CBT specifically, we calculated the effect
size across those reviewed studies that evaluated interventions
based on CBT and that reported outcomes for depression
and/or anxiety (Burgess et al., 1987; Black et al., 1998; Berkman
et al., 2003; Claesson et al., 2005; McLaughlin et al., 2005;
Michalsen et al., 2005; Koertge et al., 2008; Freedland et al., 2009;
Merswelken et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2012, 2014; O’Neil et al.,
2015). Again, effect sizes were small: 0.29 and 0.24 for anxiety and
depression, respectively. The dominant study in the Cochrane
review, and the largest RCT of CBT for cardiac patients yet
undertaken, is the ENRICHD study (Writing Committee for the
ENRICHD Investigators, 2003). ENRICHD found that, although
CBT improved depression when compared to a usual care control
condition, albeit with a small effect size of 0.33, these effects
were not maintained at follow up. Paradoxically, there was no
effect on the primary outcomes of cardiovascular morbidity and
mortality, even though further analysis showed that depression
was an independent risk factor for mortality (Carney et al.,
2003).
Why CBT has had only modest benefit in cardiac patients,
particularly when compared to mental health populations, is not
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TABLE 1 | Key elements of the cognitive behavioral and metacognitive models of distress.
The cognitive behavioral model of distress
Negative automatic thoughts (NATs)—Spontaneous thoughts that occur in everyday cognition e.g., “I will never be able to exercise again.”
Cognitive distortions—Errors in thinking, which can include:
Catastrophizing—Negative predictions about the future, with no consideration of other possible outcomes, e.g., “my life is over.”
Overgeneralization—Reaching a negative conclusion that goes beyond the present situation e.g., “I have a pain in my chest: I am having a heart attack.”
Dichotomous thinking—A situation is viewed in only two categories, e.g., “I will never be able to exercise again.”
Magnification and/or minimization—When a person or situation is evaluated the negative is magnified and/or the positive is minimized, e.g., “bad things always
happen to me, and good things always happen to other people.”
Emotional reasoning—Something is regarded as true because it is felt strongly, evidence to the contrary being ignored, e.g., “I feel like a worthless person; I am a
worthless person.”
Labeling—A negative label is assigned to oneself and/or others, without consideration of other evidence, e.g., “I can’t run as far as I used to, I am totally useless,”
“the nurse was rude to me today, he is a nasty person.”
Mind reading—Belief that others are thinking negatively about oneself, without considering more positive possibilities, e.g., “everyone thinks I am useless.”
Imperatives—A fixed idea of how oneself or others should behave and, when these expectations are not met, a negative outcome is overestimated, e.g., “If I had
done things differently I would not have had a heart attack.”
Discounting the positive—Positive experiences or qualities do not count, e.g., “the nurse said I am getting stronger, but that’s not true, he’s just trying to be nice.”
Negative beliefs
Intermediate beliefs—Rules, attitudes and assumptions that people have about themselves, others and the world around them, that may not be readily perceptible
to a therapist, e.g., “as long as I don’t do too much exercise, I will not have another heart attack.”
Core beliefs—Concern peoples’ beliefs about themselves, others and the world around them, that may not be readily perceptible to a therapist. These beliefs are
deeply entrenched and regarded as absolute truths. At times of psychological distress latent negative core beliefs are activated, e.g., “I am a failure,”
“I am unwanted.”
The metacognitive model of distress
Perseverative negative thinking-Worry and rumination that focus on self-related topics and are difficult to control.
Worry: Future orientated, e.g., “what if I have another heart attack.”
Rumination: Past orientated, e.g., “why have I had a heart attack, what could I have done differently to prevent it.”
Metacognitive beliefs-The theories and beliefs that people have about their own thinking. These may not be readily perceptible to a therapist.
Positive metacognitive beliefs—About the usefulness of worry, rumination and threat monitoring, e.g., “worrying about my health will help me to prevent future
illnesses,” “worrying means I care.”
Negative metacognitive beliefs—About the uncontrollability of thoughts and their damaging effects on the body and mind, e.g., “I can’t help worrying, I can’t
control it,” “worrying will damage my health and I will have another heart attack.”
clear. Interventions for cardiac patients have sometimes been
delivered by physical health practitioners, particularly nurses,
not specialized in psychological interventions (e.g., Burgess
et al., 1987; Frasure-Smith and Prince, 1989; Van Elderen-Van
Kemenade et al., 1994; Cowan et al., 2001), perhaps reflecting
the practical difficulties and resource constraints in offering
psychological therapy in the context of continuing clinical care.
However, it has also been suggested that the defining practice
of CBT—reality testing—might be inappropriate in a clinical
context where patients’ NATs often reflect a reality shaped by
morbidity and disability and real risks of sudden and untimely
death (Greer et al., 2010; Taylor-Ford, 2014).
A different psychological intervention that has proven
effective in mental and physical health settings is metacognitive
therapy (MCT) (Wells, 2009).MCT is based on themetacognitive
model of psychological distress (Wells and Matthews, 1996;
Wells, 2009). In this model (Table 1) psychological disorder
is linked to: (i) the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS),
which is characterized by patterns of perseverative negative
thinking (worry and rumination) that is extended and difficult
to control, threat monitoring, and attempts to control thoughts,
for example by thought suppression and reassurance seeking;
(ii) underlying metacognitive beliefs that can be conceptually
divided into positive and negative beliefs about perseverative
thinking. Positive beliefs concern the theme that repetitive
negative thinking (e.g., worry) is a helpful way of anticipating
problems, whilst negative beliefs concern the theme that such
thinking is uncontrollable and dangerous. Whilst the CBT
model emphasizes the content of thoughts, MCT emphasizes
perseveration of negative thinking as the process maintaining
distress. Unlike CBT, the MCT therapist does not challenge the
content of perseverative negative thinking or the veracity of
beliefs about the self and world. Instead the therapist helps the
patient bring perseverative negative thinking under control, and
challenges underlying metacognitive beliefs.
In a recent meta-analysis of anxiety and depression treatment
trials in mental health populations, MCT was more effective
than waitlist control, with a very high effect size of 1.81, and
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was more effective than CBT, with a large effect size of 0.97
(Normann et al., 2014). Although no randomized controlled
trial (RCT) of MCT for psychological distress in physical health
populations is yet complete, support for its potential relevance
to distressed cardiac rehabilitation (CR) patients comes from
evidence of the association between metacognitive beliefs and
psychological distress in a range of physical diseases including
cancer (Thewes et al., 2013; Cook et al., 2015), Parkinson’s disease
(Allot et al., 2005; Brown and Fernie, 2015; Fernie et al., 2015)
epilepsy (Fisher and Noble, 2017), chronic fatigue syndrome
(Maher-Edwards et al., 2011, 2012), fibromyalgia (Kollmann
et al., 2016), and diabetes (Purewal and Fisher, 2018). Clinically
significant reductions in anxiety and depression in an open
trial of MCT for emotional distress in adolescent and young
cancer survivors (Fisher et al., 2015) and in a case series in
adult cancer survivors (Fisher et al., 2017) add support for the
potential relevance of MCT to anxious and/or depressed cardiac
patients.
While RCTs are the “gold standard” for establishing the
efficacy of psychological interventions, it is now recognized
that complementary kinds of research are needed to provide
information that RCTs, alone, cannot. In particular, qualitative
methods can illuminate the transferability of interventions into
real-life (O’Cathain et al., 2013). Specifically, O’Cathain et al.
(2013) point to the need for qualitative methods to assess
the “fit” between interventions, as idealized in theory and
protocols, and the reality of the conditions they are intended
to treat. UK Medical Research Council guidance therefore
advocates a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods
in treatment evaluation, the value of qualitative methods being
specifically to help understanding complex causal pathways and
generate new theory (Campbell et al., 2000; Moore et al., 2015).
Over recent years, qualitative methods have also been used
more widely to examine aspects of the “fit” between formal
psychological theory and the “lived experience” of patients with
physical health problems, including CR patients (Ciechanowski
and Katon, 2006; Tang et al., 2009; Angus et al., 2018). In
the present study our primary objective was to compare how
CBT and MCT models conceptualize cardiac patients’ distress,
and specifically to explore the “fit” between these models and
patients’ own accounts of their experience of distress. Our
secondary objectives were to identify potential reasons why
CBT has low efficacy in this group and to explore whether
MCT has the potential to be more efficacious. Our data were
interviews in which CR patients described their distress. We
addressed these objectives by examining patients’ accounts
qualitatively from the perspectives of both CBT and MCT,
thereby exploring the “fit” between formal theory and patients’
experience.
METHODS
Sample
This research was conducted as part of the UK NIHR
funded PATHWAY programme (PATHWAY; RP-PG-1211-
20011; Ethical approval from NRES Committee North West,
REC reference: 15/NW/0163), a RCT that compares usual
CR to CR plus six sessions of Group-MCT delivered by CR
practitioners with additional training inMCT (Wells et al., 2018).
Inclusion criteria were a score of ≥ 8 on the depression and/or
anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
(HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) and meeting CR eligibility
criteria (British Association for Cardiovascular Prevention and
Rehabilitation, 2012). Upon entry to the PATHWAY programme,
patients completed the HADS (to indicate probable clinical levels
of distress) and the Impact of Event Scale Revised (IES-R) (to
assess symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder; Weiss, 2007),
and a clinical record form which collected socio-demographic
information, details of their cardiac condition, any comorbid
health conditions, and any past and/or current medication
and/or therapies for psychological distress (Table 2). To enable
nested qualitative studies, patients who gave or withheld written
informed consent to join the trial were asked for written
informed consent for qualitative interviews.
Of the first 79 patients who consented to take part in the RCT,
77 agreed to being contacted about qualitative research. Sixty
patients, purposively sampled to include women and men with
differing levels of distress and clinical profiles, were contacted
by telephone, of whom 46 provided written informed consent to
the qualitative study and took part in interviews. Of the first 43
patients who declined consent for the RCT, 15 consented to be
contacted about qualitative interviews, all of whom we contacted
by telephone, and 3 of whom provided written informed consent
to be interviewed. The total number of patients interviewed
was 49; 15 were female, and patients ages ranged from 38 to
79, median 57. Most patients described themselves as White
British, 2 as Caribbean, 2 as Asian, and 2 as Australasian.
Patients’ cardiac conditions were MI, adult congenital heart
disease, stable heart failure, stable angina, and atrial fibrillation
(Supplementary Table 1). Patients were interviewed during CR,
but before starting Group-MCT as part of the PATHWAY trial.
Procedure
RM conducted interviews in a conversational style in patients’
homes (n = 39), a private office (n = 7), where patients received
CR (n= 2), or in a public café (n= 1), as each patient requested.
RM’s first meeting with each patient was at this interview. No
other author met any patient. To begin each interview, RM
explained that she was not a therapist, and assured patients that
their comments would be anonymized before disclosure to the
research team. An interview guide using open questions and
prompts facilitated patients’ talk; closed questions were used
to probe specific points. The pace, sequencing and length of
interviews therefore depended on patients. Interviews lasted 29–
105min (mean 58min). The interview guide was modified in
parallel with analysis, to test and develop emerging ideas. Each
patient was asked about their emotional experiences since their
cardiac event (e.g., “can you tell me how you’ve been feeling
since your heart attack?”), and to describe in detail distress they
had experienced including the content of distressing thoughts,
the nature of distressing emotions, when they experienced these
thoughts and emotions, and how they responded to them (e.g.,
“what goes through your mind when you are feeling low?,” “what
do you do when you feel sad or anxious?”). They were also asked
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about their understanding of the causes and consequences of
their distress, and their thoughts and feelings about their future
(e.g., “why do you think you feel like this?,” “what do you feel
about the future?”).
Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and
pseudo-anonymized. Microsoft Word was used to manage the
data during analysis (La Pelle, 2004). In line with recent
recommendations, we sought to tailor methods to specific
research questions in order to ensure fidelity to the data and
utility in achieving research goals (Levitt et al., 2017). Analysis
therefore followed three stages. First, inductive analysis first
followed a constant comparative approach whereby we identified
commonalities and contrasts in how patients described and
understood their distress. RM led this analysis, which was tested
and refined in regular discussion amongst RM, PF, and PS, who
all read the transcripts, and periodically including AW who read
selected extracts. Findings from this stage of analysis will be
reported separately.
We then returned to the transcripts and re-examined patients’
accounts of their distress from the perspectives of the CBT
and MCT models. Analysis combined deductive and inductive
elements. The main categories of the CBT and MCT models
provided an initial template. The inductive element was not to
develop those categories, as in the usual approach to template
analysis (Crabtree and Miller, 1999), but to understand their “fit”
with patients’ experience. Our primary criterion for “fit” was
parsimony: how simply the models could be related to patients’
accounts of their distress. In addition, we were interested in
how readily and how extensively each model could be applied
across the varied manifestations of patients’ distress; that is, how
therapeutically “workable” each model would be. We did not
apply a checklist, but relied on our interpretation of the patients’
subjective experience; that is, we took a stance resembling that
of a therapist who seeks to identify aspects of patients’ talk with
which s/he can engage. Recognizing that the meaning of data in
qualitative research is produced jointly by the participant and the
interviewer or analyst—just as in therapy it is a product of the
therapist and patient in interaction—we emphasized reflexivity;
that is, we regarded our own experience of applying the template
as data to be discussed and reflected on.When analyzing from the
perspective of the CBT model, we focused on identifying distinct
NATs, and then categorized the cognitive distortions apparent in
these (Beck, 1976). Often, multiple distortions could be identified
in the same text but, to simplify presentation, we coded only
the most salient one. When analyzing from the perspective
of the MCT model, we focused on identifying talk showing
perseverative negative thinking—worry or rumination. When
we saw possible underlying beliefs—negative beliefs from the
perspective of CBT, or metacognitive beliefs from the perspective
of MCT—these were also coded. This part of the analysis
proceeded iteratively; any text coded as relevant to one model
was re-examined from the alternate perspective. RM led this stage
of the analysis also, in regular discussions with PS and PF, and
periodically with AW. Taking a “disputational” approach, we
identified and developed competing interpretations and tested
their validity by evidence-based argumentation amongst the
group.
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Across the sample, we saw several respects in which the
perspectives of the CBT and MCT models could be used
to conceptualize CR patients’ distress differently. We then
purposively selected four transcripts reflecting diversity in the
presentation and clinical context of distress for detailed analysis
to illustrate that divergence (Table 2). We included patients
whose distress was linked primarily to their cardiac event, and
those whose distress was linked to other health and non-health
problems. We also sought diversity in the profile and intensity
of distress as indicated by HADS and IES-R scores. Analysis
proceeded as for the overall sample, but focusing only on detailed
scrutiny of these cases.
The research team brought different perspectives to analysis.
RM has experience of research in medical sociology and
the psychology of health language and communication, and
specifically of qualitative research on patient experiences of
physical health care. AW, PF, and PS are clinical psychologists
with experience of physical health care: AW has contributed to
the development of CBT and is the originator of MCT, and is
experienced in treating various psychopathologies in different
patient populations using both therapies; PF is experienced
in CBT and MCT and in applying MCT to physical health
populations; PS has expertise in qualitative analysis of patients’
needs and experiences in physical health care, in the development
and synthesis of qualitative methods, and in critical analysis of
psychological theory in health care.
Table 3 shows data extracts from each transcript and relevant
coding. We selected extracts that illustrated the main features of
the analysis across the range of each patient’s concerns. InTable 3
extracts are shown in the sequence in which they arose in the
interview, italicized text provides context for each extract, ellipses
are used to indicate omitted talk, and square brackets indicate
RM’s talk and explanatory comments. Figures in parenthesis
in the main text indicate corresponding extracts in Table 3.
Pseudonyms are used and identifying details removed to preserve
anonymity.
RESULTS
As will be reported elsewhere, inductive analysis of all interview
transcripts identified CR patients’ diverse concerns about their
cardiac event, including the continuing risk to their lives and
the constraints that reduction in energy or confidence, as well as
continuing medical treatment or surveillance, imposed on their
lives. Patients also reported dwelling on regrets from their early
life and worrying about current or future challenges unrelated to
their physical health.
When considering the transcripts from the perspectives of
CBT or MCT, CR patients’ distress was conceptualized very
differently. From the perspective of CBT, we identified relatively
focused and distinct sections of patients’ talk that contained
NATs, and that displayed many cognitive distortions (Beck,
1976), although it was often difficult to agree which category
of distortion to allocate specific NATs to. It was also sometimes
difficult to decide whether specific negative thoughts, particularly
relating to cardiac disease, were realistic or unrealistic. We were
also able to identify patients’ negative beliefs about themselves,
(such as being inadequate), about the world around them (such
as other people seeing them as inadequate), and about the future
(for example that life is pointless). From the perspective of
MCT, we identified longer sections of patients’ talk, which could
readily be understood as perseverative negative thinking (worry
or rumination), and which encompassed many of the different
NATs and cognitive distortions that were categorized in detail
from the CBT perspective. These chains of perseverative negative
thinking included some talk that had not been coded as relevant
from a CBT perspective. We also identified patients’ positive
metacognitive beliefs, including that rumination would help
them understand why they had experienced a cardiac event and
that worry would prepare them for a future one. We identified
negative metacognitive beliefs, also, specifically that thinking
about illness was uncontrollable and harmful and threatened
their mental health or risked worsening their cardiac disease.
Table 2 describes the four cases selected to develop and
illustrate these findings. Kieran, with HADS scores suggesting
mild depression, described no history of emotional problems
before his diagnosis of CHD and subsequent coronary artery
bypass graft (CABG). He attributed his unhappiness mainly
to his cardiac illness and the threat it presented to enjoying
his impending retirement. Emily, with HADS scores suggesting
moderate anxiety and depression, had felt depressed and even
suicidal before her MI, although she had never been diagnosed
with anxiety or depression. Her concerns centered on fear
of another MI and difficulty sleeping. Paul, whose HADS
scores suggested moderate anxiety and depression, had been
diagnosed with depression and anxiety, had attempted suicide
previously, and had received psychotherapy and anti-depressant
medication. In addition to concerns about the loss of his
career, and therefore his home, because of his MI, Paul dwelled
on the breakdown of previous romantic relationships and on
difficulties in his relationship with his father during childhood.
Mary had been diagnosed with angina and treated with a
coronary angioplasty. Her HADS scores suggested moderate
anxiety and depression. She had a history of depression, and
still took anti-depressant medication. Her concerns centered on
her son’s alcoholism and her problematic relationship with her
husband.
Conceptualizing Patients’ Distress From a
Cognitive Behavioral Perspective
Each patient’s talk showed a diverse range of NATs concerning
fear of their cardiac disease and the impact this already had
on their lives, or may have in future. Paul (3b,d,e) and Mary
(4b,c,e,f) also voiced NATs about social and family relationships,
and Kieran (1d) and Paul (3b,c,d,e) about past events. Every
patient’s talk also indicated possible negative beliefs. Like their
NATs, these were diverse. Some were specifically related to
cardiac disease. For instance, Kieran (1d,e) described believing
that his retirement would be less fulfilling than he had imagined,
because of limitations he envisaged as a result of his CHD,
Emily (2a,b) indicated the belief that she would have another
MI that would be fatal, Mary (4a) was concerned that she
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TABLE 3 | Cardiac patients’ emotional distress conceptualized from the perspectives of cognitive behavioral and metacognitive models of distress.
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a CBT perspective
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a MCT perspective
Bold text shows elements of
patients’ accounts that a CBT
therapist might engage with
Underlined text shows elements of
patients’ accounts that a MCT
therapist might engage with
Possible negative
beliefs
Cognitive
distortions
contained in
negative automatic
thoughts
Perseverative
negative
thinking:
worry or
rumination
Possible metacognitive
beliefs
Case 1: Kieran
At the start of the interview, after being asked how
he came to be in CR, Kieran recounted events
leading to his diagnosis, the diagnostic tests he had
undergone and his decision to undergo CABG. RM
asked how Kieran felt during the period of
diagnostic testing and since CABG:
1a.
Embarrassed to be honest… somebody
says “go on that treadmill” and then
after two minutes, “sorry I’m going
to have to stop.” You think “it
“I did not perform
as I should, so I
am inadequate”
Imperative shouldn’t be like this, I should be able
to go on forever”… it was a bit
disappointing, the gradual realization
that your health is not as good as you
thought it might have been.
Rumination
Earlier, Kieran had talked about feeling “sorry for”
himself; RM now prompted him about this:
1b.
You explain to people what you’ve
been through, you get a bit tearful
and you think “oh well, stop feeling
sorry for yourself”… snap out of it…
you look at other people of a similar
Rumination
Overgeneralization
age… they seem to be a lot fitter
than you… I was always fit, all my
life, and now I am the most unfit
person I know…
RM prompted him about his feeling that having
coronary heart disease felt unfair:
1c
Magnification and
minimization
I’ve worked hard all my life and you
see other guys that you think haven’t
worked hard all their lives and they
haven’t gone to the gym… I get myself
reasonably fit and I can’t understand,
me and them, and they’re enjoying
themselves.
Rumination
While responding to a later question about the time
that he spent worrying, Kieran introduced talk about
his past, and became tearful:
1d.
You start to think back to the
friends that you had… when you’re
playing old music and then your
memories start flooding back and it
can be quite difficult… I’ve
deliberately not done that anymore…
you work hard and you’re getting
toward something when you can perhaps
start to slow down and you think
Rumination
(Continued)
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TABLE 3 | Continued
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a CBT perspective
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a MCT perspective
“My life would
have been better if
I had made
different choices”
Discounting the
positive
“I’ve got a health problem” and you
think “oh where’s all my friends,”
you left them behind thirty years
ago… you move away from your friends
and you think “it wasn’t worth it.”
Rumination
RM asked whether he could ever stop feeling sorry
for himself :
1e.
“Retirement will
not be as
enjoyable as I
thought”
Catastrophizing
Only by doing some sort of activity…
if you’ve got a bit more variety in
your activities, you’re not going to
get bored, you don’t then sit down
and start dwelling on things that
might upset you… the last 5 weeks
have been a bit of an eye opener… as
you approach retirement you think “I
actually quite fancy retiring”… but
in this last 5 weeks, this is what
retirement is about, I’ve got to keep
working, thank you… your mind would
be more active, you can’t always be
thinking “what can I do now?”
Rumination
Worry
“Thinking is
uncontrollable”
Case 2: Emily
When RM began by asking how she came to be in
CR, Emily recounted in detail the evening of her MI,
and the treatment that she had received since. RM
asked how Emily had felt since the MI:
2a.
“I am going to
have another MI; if
I do, I will die”
Catastrophizing I can’t get to sleep… I think if I go
to sleep I’m not going to wake up… I
don’t even think about it [heart
attack] until I go to bed… [Then] I
just re-run everything through my
mind, I just re-run that whole Friday
night and what if, what if my heart
had stopped beating before we’d got
to [the hospital]
Worry
Rumination “Thinking will help
me to find
answers”
RM prompted Emily about her fear that she might
not wake up:
2b.
“If I have another
MI, I will die”
Catastrophizing
The heart attack to me was not like
you would see a heart attack on the
TV… the grabbing the chest… you drop
to the floor… it wasn’t that bad, so
in my head… the pain that I had when
I had my heart attack, I could sleep
through that… I think that’s where
Rumination
the worry comes from, because if the
same thing happens again, I would
probably stay asleep, or what if the
stent doesn’t hold out… it’s all
these things going through my head,
because it’s only a thin little piece
of metal”
Worry
“Thinking will help
me to be
prepared”
After talking about avoiding going to bed due to her
fear of not waking up, and about not wishing to
disclose her fears in the context of CR, Emily
recounted discussing her MI with a friend who had
undergone CABG:
2c.
“I am stupid” Emotional
reasoning
This is why I think I feel stupid
because he’s [friend] had a double
heart bypass, I’ve just had a stent
Rumination
(Continued)
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TABLE 3 | Continued
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a CBT perspective
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a MCT perspective
put in, it’s nothing… I rang him up I
said “has it affected you,” and he
was like “no… just carrying on with
life”… and there’s me thinking shit,
well why has it affected me, all I’ve
got is a STENT”
Rumination “Thinking will help
me to find
answers”
RM prompted Emily to talk more about concerns
that she had mentioned earlier, first about her sleep:
2d.
Catastrophizing I worry about not being able to sleep
when I go back to work, because that
would worry me because I need to be able
to sleep, so that I can do my job
correctly”
Worry
Then about why she continued to think about the
night she had her MI:
2e.
Catastrophizing
I lie in bed thinking “stop bloody
thinking about it… you’re alive for
god’s sake”… I’m tossing and turning
but it’s still always there, in the
back of my mind”… no matter how many
times I run through it… everything
that’s been said to me… I think the
problem is I’ve got a medical
background… I know a bit too much and
that doesn’t help me at all… it makes
it worse”… [RM: Is it every night you
are like this?] “Yeah… there have
been nights where I’ve not slept at
all… so in the day time I have fallen
asleep on the sofa… in my head it’s
okay to sleep in the day because
somebody would find me.
Rumination
Worry
“Thinking is
uncontrollable”;
“thinking will help me
find answers”; “thinking
is harmful”
Case 3: Paul
When asked how he came to be in CR, Paul talked
about delays in responding to his MI because of GP
misdiagnosis, and about this resulting in a worse
prognosis than had he been treated for his MI
sooner. He also spoke about his Crohn’s and kidney
diseases. When recounting his kidney transplant, he
introduced his feelings about an ex-partner, from
whom he had separated 2 years previously. He said
he still thinks about their break-up daily. He said that
he keeps busy to avoid thinking about this and other
concerns and explained:
3a.
But now I’m not working and I’ve got
more time on my hands, I’m my own
worst enemy because… the only time
I’m alright is when I’m asleep,
because then I am not thinking about
things… I analyse everything… I’m
terrible.”
Rumination “Thinking is
uncontrollable”
Paul explained that he “analyses everything”; and
talked again about his previous relationship:
3b.
“It is all my fault” Imperatives
I start analyzing it [past
relationship]… I’m trying to assert
blame… who’s at fault… is it something
I could have foreseen and maybe done
something about… it’s that “if only”
scenario when I sit there thinking
Rumination “Thinking will help
me find answers”
(Continued)
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Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a CBT perspective
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a MCT perspective
“well if only I’d done that, or if
only I hadn’t said that, if only I’d
gone about it this way’… it just goes
round and round and round up there…
it’s easier to blame yourself than it
is to blame others”
Rumination “Thinking will help
me find answers”
RM prompted Paul about how much he blamed
himself:
3c.
“It is all my fault” Imperative
“Quite a lot really… this you know,
could I have foreseen the fact that I
was going to have a heart attack, I
blame myself for not ringing an
ambulance when I should have done…
maybe things would have been
different, but then if I think like
that it’s just going to eat away, but
it does… I think “god all I had to do
is phone nine nine nine… but then I
felt alright on Sunday… so you think
to yourself “oh I must be alright.”
Rumination “Thinking will help
me find answers”
While discussing how Paul keeps busy to stop
thinking like this, he introduced his childhood:
3d.
“I expect that bad
things will always
happen to me”
Catastrophizing
My childhood hasn’t been brilliant…
the relationship with my dad is not
very good, he was a bit of a tyrant
to say the least… I expect [bad]
things to happen because that’s the
way I sort of see it… if it’s going
to happen, it’s going to happen to
me… but it’s that analyzing again… if
it had been anybody else they
wouldn’t have probably lost their job
over it, whereas I have.
Rumination
“Thinking will help
me find answers”
Dichotomous
thinking
I can’t drive a truck anymore, so that’s
my career gone… I can no longer afford to
stay living in me flat… so it’s not just a
matter of having a heart attack…
[another person who has had a heart
attack] they’ve got a partner who they
can rely on, and you’re just thinking
“why me”
RM asked Paul how often he thinks about the
problems he had told her about:
3e.
“I am helpless” Imperative
All the time really… even when I was
at work… me mind is ticking away with
things all the time… you get home and
you just don’t seem to be able to
switch off.” [RM: How long have you
been thinking about these things?]…
Oh years… as far back as I can
remember to be honest… because it
wasn’t good with my Dad… if I’d have
probably been brought up or treated
differently… these things might not
have happened.
Rumination
“Thinking is
uncontrollable”
RM then asked Paul how he copes with feeling low:
3f.
I just want to be on my own… I don’t
want to bump into someone and then I
know what they are going to say, “are
you alright”… and you’ve got to go
(Continued)
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Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a CBT perspective
Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a MCT perspective
Mind reading
“yeah, of course I am… how are you?”
And then they start going on about
their troubles… I’m thinking to
myself, “you don’t know the flaming
half of it”… that just makes me feel
worse… angry… they’re going on about
how they’ve stubbed their toe on a
door… these people, there is nothing
Rumination
Magnification and
minimization
wrong with them… and you’re just
thinking I’ll swap with you tomorrow…
you don’t know the half of it’... “I know
it’s definitely not useful [to think
this way], I know it’s more harmful than
good, I know that… but I still do it.”
“Thinking is
harmful”
Case 4: Mary
When Mary discussed what led to her admission to
CR at the start of the interview, she talked, not only
about her angina, but also about other physical
health conditions and about being diagnosed with
depression in her twenties, resulting in her taking
anti-depressant medication ever since. Mary
explained:
4a.
Catastrophizing
“That [physical health conditions]
did all did get me down, and made me
cry… I just felt bombarded with
hospital appointments... all that
plays on my mind… with my work as
well… maybe not being able to look
after [adult Mary cares for]… so that
worries me, putting him somewhere… [I
am] worrying about going in and
having the stuff [operations] done.”
Worry
When RM asked Mary to describe her feelings
about this impending treatment, she spontaneously
introduced her relationship with her husband:
4b.
“I am worthless”
“I am worthless”
Emotional
reasoning
Emotional
reasoning
“Me and my husband are going through
a not good patch… just loads of
different things which really, really
get me down… it’s just what goes on
in my head… I feel like a worthless
person… and my husband makes me feel
like that” [Mary becomes tearful]…
[RM: Why do you feel worthless?]
Because I feel like I am made to feel
like that… my opinion or anything I
say don’t mean anything… I feel like
it’s not worth listening to”
Rumination
Earlier, Mary had mentioned her fears for her family,
mainly for her son whose alcohol consumption
concerned her, and for her relationship with her
husband. RM now prompted Mary about those
concerns:
4c.
Catastrophizing
It’s mainly [my son], I just want him
right… I can’t get on with my own
life… I can’t see further than the
day… I can’t see a future or
anything… because I worry about when
he’s [husband] coming home from work,
what
Worry
(Continued)
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Patients’ distress conceptualized
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Patients’ distress conceptualized
from a MCT perspective
he’s going to say, I’m just on pins
constantly… he [husband] thinks he is
the most marvelous person going
RM asked Mary if she was concerned about her
cardiac health; Mary responded that she was not,
and then spontaneously returned to how she felt
about herself:
4d.
“I am ugly” Labeling
I mean I don’t like myself, I think I
am ugly… I’ve got low self-esteem
about myself, I can’t even speak
right… [RM: How long have you been
feeling like this for?]… “A long
time… maybe a couple of years I have
been feeling like this… I mean I
won’t even go out, I go shopping and
I go to my sister’s to get dressed
up, I just think everyone’s thinking
Rumination
“I am worthless”
Mind reading
Emotional
reasoning
what a fat ugly cow” [RM: How often
do you think these thoughts?] every
day… if I put make up on, someone
will say “oh you look pretty,” I just
think they are lying… my sister,
she’ll say “put a bit of make up on,
you’ll feel better,” but because I
feel worthless I think what’s the
point.
Mary talked more about her concerns for her
relationship and her son:
4e.
All I want is my family to be right…
all I want is to be happy and I’m
just not [crying]… [RM: so do you
spend a lot of time worrying about
your family and thinking about all
these things?] All the time… the
minute I wake up and the minute I go
to sleep… eighty per cent [of the
time… thinking about]… if he’s [son]
at his flat, I’m worrying myself
sick, if he’s drinking… when he don’t
answer his phone, I think he’s dead”…
Rumination
“Thinking is
uncontrollable”
“If my son drinks,
the worst will
happen”
“If my son drinks,
the worst will
happen”
Catastrophizing
Catastrophizing
thinking he’s drank himself into a
stupor and choked and died… and how
am I going to get into his flat, I
mean I’ve been to hospital ten times
with him… he broke his jaw twice… the
first time I ever went to hospital
with him, he ended up having a
seizure… every time he drinks, I
think he is going to have a fit… I’m
just worried sick about him all the
time.
Worry
“Thinking will help
me to be
prepared”
Mary explains that she talks to her husband about
her concerns for her son:
4f.
My husband seems to dismiss it
[concern for her son] and says “oh
forget about it, get on with your
life”… how can I, what mother would I
be?’… I’m his mother and mothers do
worry about their kids… especially
when it’s something like this
Worry “Thinking is
uncontrollable”
(Continued)
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Patients’ distress conceptualized
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[RM: so would you say you can’t help
it?] I can’t help it, no… if I knew
he was alright I’d be happier… I can
probably over-analyse a lot of stuff…
dealing with something in my head
that hasn’t happened yet, but maybe
it will… I’m sat here worrying myself
sick over him… I just can’t help it,
I can’t switch off from it.”
Worry
“Thinking will help
me to be
prepared”
would be unable to fulfill her role as a carer, and Paul (3c,d)
believed that the effects of his MI on his health might have
been mitigated had he called an ambulance sooner, and treated
earlier. However, many negative beliefs concerned other areas
of life, even pre-dating cardiac disease. Mary (4b,c,d) talked
openly about being “stupid,” “ugly,” and “worthless,” indicating
persistent negative beliefs about herself that she described having
for “years,” before being diagnosed with angina. Paul (3b,d)
blamed himself for neglecting previous romantic relationships,
and for not seeking medical help for his MI earlier than he
did. Additionally, Paul (3e) described consistently expecting “bad
things” to happen to him that he was helpless to influence, such
as breakdown in relationships, complaining that he might have
been able to prevent them had he been “brought up or treated
differently.”
Every patient displayed several cognitive distortions (Beck,
1976). Catastrophizing was common, particularly in NATs
concerning cardiac disease: for example, Emily’s NATs (2a,b,d,e)
that she would have a second MI, and that this would kill
her, and Kieran’s (1e) NAT that his CHD would devastate his
retirement plans. For Paul and Mary, catastrophic thinking
extended beyond cardiac disease, for instance in Paul’s (3d)
NAT that “bad things” happen to him and Mary’s (4e) NAT
that that her son would die if he returned to drinking
alcohol. Patients’ NATs contained further distortions, including
magnification and minimization, imperatives, dichotomous
thinking, and emotional reasoning. For example, Kieran’s (1c)
NATs contrasting his own experiences with others’ illustrated
magnification and minimization: he minimized others work
and efforts to be healthy when complaining that “they haven’t
worked hard all their lives and they haven’t gone to the gym,”
and magnified their experiences when he suggested “they’re
enjoying themselves.” Paul’s (3b,c) NATs concerning previous
relationships and his MI contained imperatives: he lamented that
“if only” he had done things differently his relationship might
not have broken down, and that he “should” have called an
ambulance sooner, and his NATs (3d) concerning the impact
of his MI contained dichotomous thinking: that he “can’t
drive a truck,” and that his “career” [had] “gone.” Emily and
Mary displayed NATs that contained emotional reasoning, as
Emily (2c) described “feel[ing] stupid” because her STENT had
“affected” her, in contrast to a friend who had been unaffected
by a double heart bypass, and Mary (4b) “[felt] like a worthless
person,” because her husband made her feel that “anything [she
said] don’t mean anything.”
Some of the NATs, negative beliefs and cognitive distortions
described above seemed clearly unrealistic, for example Kieran’s
(1a) minimization and magnification. However, others reflected
elements of patients’ clinical reality. Because of the physical
impact of his MI, Paul (3d) could no longer drive a truck, and
so had lost his job and could not afford to keep his flat. Mary’s
(4a) concerns about not being able to work as a carer predict
a likely, albeit temporary, consequence of her clinical reality.
In many instances, however, it was difficult to categorize the
NATs, negative beliefs or cognitive distortions as either realistic
or unrealistic. For instance, Kieran’s (1e) prediction that his CHD
would preclude activities he had planned for retirement might
reflect the reality of disability associated with CHD for many
patients, and Emily’s (2a,b) fear of a fatal MI might reflect a real,
albeit potentially small, risk.
We coded only the most salient cognitive distortion for any
NAT. However, multiple distortions could readily be identified
in many NATs, and it was often difficult to decide which to
prioritize. For instance, Kieran’s (1b) NAT about being “the most
unfit person I know’ shows over-generalization, but might also
be regarded as magnification and minimization or as labeling.
Similarly, we coded Mary’s (4e) NAT that, if her son drank
alcohol again, it would kill him as catastrophic thinking, but it
also might be understood as overgeneralization or dichotomous
thinking.
In summary, each patient’s distress could be readily
conceptualized using the CBT model. This involved identifying a
diverse range of NATs, negative beliefs and cognitive distortions.
However, distinguishing between unrealistic and realistic NATs
and negative beliefs could be difficult, particularly when they
were associated with patients’ cardiac disease.
Conceptualizing Patients’ Distress From a
Metacognitive Perspective
Every patient described experiences that could readily be
interpreted as indicating perseverative negative thinking. For
example, Paul (3a) explained that the only time that he did
not ruminate was while asleep, Emily (2e) complained that
rumination about the night of her MI prevented her from
sleeping, and Mary (4e) reported being “worried sick” about
her son “all the time,” all clearly indicating the repetitive
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and extended thinking that characterize perseverative negative
thinking. Every patient also displayed perseverative negative
thinking in “real time” during their interviews. For instance,
Mary repeatedly talked about her son’s drinking, her relationship
with her husband, and about how she felt about herself, even
when asked about seemingly unrelated topics. Similarly, Paul
introduced regrets over his previous relationships and childhood
repeatedly throughout his interview. The single category of
perseverative negative thinking encompassed most of the talk
that, from the perspective of CBT, was understood as diverse
NATs, negative beliefs, and cognitive distortions. It also included
sections of talk that were not coded as significant from the
CBT perspective, for example Kieran’s (1d) regrets about losing
contact with old friends, Emily’s (2e) description of mentally
“re-running” her MI, Paul’s (3a) explanation that the only time
he is “alright” is when asleep, and Mary’s (4f) account of
“worrying” about her adult children, particularly her alcoholic
son.
Each patient’s account contained evidence of negative
metacognitive beliefs (Wells, 1995). Kieran (1e) alluded to
believing that he lacked control over thinking, when he described
needing to keep busy during retirement so that he would not
“always be thinking.” The other patients were more explicit about
believing they lacked control. Mary (4f) and Paul (3e) reported
being unable to “switch off” worrying or ruminating, and Emily
(2e) described rumination that was “always there.” Emily and
Paul also indicated possible beliefs about the harmfulness of
thinking. Emily (2e) referred to her “medical background” as
a “problem” because knowing “too much” made her “worse”
(2e), while Paul (3f) explained that “thinking to [him]self ” about
the differences between himself and others was “more harmful
than good.” Three patients’ accounts also demonstrated positive
metacognitive beliefs that thinking would help them to find
answers and be prepared. Emily (2a,c,e) reported “re-running”
the night of her MI and continuing to ask herself why her
MI had affected her so badly. Similarly, Paul (3b) described
“analyzing” a past relationship, lest he could have “foreseen
and maybe done something about” its breakdown, and Mary
(4e) explained that she deals “with something in [her] head
that hasn’t happened yet, but maybe it will.” Much of the text
coded as metacognitive beliefs from the perspective of MCT
was not coded at all from the perspective of CBT; for example
text coded as Emily’s (2a,e) metacognitive beliefs that thinking
about the events that led to her MI was uncontrollable and
harmful but would help her find answers, and as Mary’s (4f)
metacognitive beliefs that worrying is both uncontrollable and
useful.
In summary, conceptualizing cardiac patients’ distress from
the perspective of MCT proved more parsimonious than from
that of CBT; the diverse range of NATs, cognitive distortions
and negative beliefs identified from the perspective of CBT were
largely contained within the single category of perseverative
negative thinking, which also included text not coded as relevant
to CBT. There were possible metacognitive beliefs, also often in
text not coded as relevant to CBT. Examining accounts from
the perspective of MCT did not require decisions as to whether
distressing thoughts were unrealistic.
DISCUSSION
We addressed our primary objective by comparing how CR
patients’ accounts of distress can be understood from CBT and
MCT perspectives. Focusing on the content of patients’ concerns,
taking a CBT perspective meant allocating specific elements
of patients’ accounts of their distress across many discrete
categories: different NATs and negative beliefs and the multiple
cognitive distortions that maintain them. In contrast, MCT
was more parsimonious in that a single category—perseverative
negative thinking—encompassed most of that text. Moreover,
understanding distress from the perspective of CBT involved
difficult judgments as to whether negative thoughts were realistic
or unrealistic, whereas this distinction was not necessary from an
MCT perspective. Our findings therefore address our secondary
objectives in pointing to potential reasons why CBT has low
efficacy for cardiac patients and why MCT might have a better
fit with distress in this population.
Our findings suggest two respects in which the CBT model
might be a poor fit with CR patients’ distress. First, patients
described diverse NATs and negative beliefs, encompassing not
only cardiac disease but other areas of their lives including
problems that long pre-dated their cardiac diagnosis. In the
context of a time-limited therapy, it will rarely be possible for a
CBT therapist to address all these for any patient. CBT therapists
are advised to target specific NATs and negative beliefs according
to how distressing or dysfunctional they are, or how persistent
they are (Beck, 1976). However, CBT theory does not itself specify
how a therapist can choose between multiple NATs and negative
beliefs that might all be distressing, dysfunctional and persistent,
and does not stipulate how addressing specific NATs and negative
beliefs will alleviate distress caused by unaddressed NATs and
negative beliefs. Furthermore, since a single NAT can contain
more than one cognitive distortion, it can be difficult to decide
which is the “main” one, leading to the risk that the CBT therapist
will not target the most critical distortion.
The second reason why the CBT model had questionable
fit with CR patients’ distress was because of the importance it
attaches to identifying and challenging unrealistic thoughts and
beliefs. In the context of a recent life-threatening cardiac event,
continuing vulnerability to cardiac problems, and attendant
disability and uncertainty about the future, patients had
many negative thoughts and beliefs that could not be readily
categorized as realistic or unrealistic. Reality testing patients’
realistic concerns about their health, and about the toll that
ill-health has taken, or might take, on their lives is, at best,
inappropriate and, at worst, absurd (Greer et al., 2010). CBT
theory has therefore evolved to address the challenge of realistic
negative thoughts in the context of life-threatening disease,
particularly cancer (Greer et al., 2010; Moorey and Greer, 2012;
van de Wal et al., 2015; Temple, 2017). However, adaptations
of the theory center on differentiating between realistic and
unrealistic concerns; realistic concerns can then be targeted using
problem solving. Trying to decide whether NATs and negative
beliefs are realistic or not, particularly in the context of real
disability, and small but potentially fatal risks of further cardiac
events, adds further complexity to the therapeutic process.
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Moreover, engaging patients in such decisions risks exacerbating
their distress—for instance where they focus on a small, but real
chance of a further MI in the future.
MCT requires fewer difficult or arbitrary decisions from a
therapist. It is not necessary to identify the negative thoughts
that are “most important,” or to distinguish realistic from
unrealistic ones. Instead, an MCT therapist would understand
the diverse concerns of CR patients as evidence of a single
process of perseverative negative thinking. Moreover, elements
of patients’ accounts that cannot be understood in terms of
any of the classic categories of the CBT model are significant
from the perspective of MCT when they are further examples
of perseverative negative thinking. Our findings also showed
that patients make their metacognitive beliefs, which, according
to the MCT model, maintain perseverative negative thinking,
accessible to therapists. MCT might therefore have a better fit
with distress in CR patients, because MCT therapists can target
perseverative negative thinking, and the metacognitive beliefs
that underlie this, and thereby address patients’ diverse concerns,
both unrealistic and realistic, in a time-limited therapy.
LIMITATIONS
As a qualitative study in a single setting, our findings cannot
automatically be generalized. However, our qualitative approach
allowed us to explore the “fit” between theory and reality in a way
that is grounded in patients’ own accounts of their distress. The
selection of only four patients’ transcripts for detailed analysis
risks what Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) call “key informant
bias” if those accounts do not represent the full sample. To
minimize this risk, we selected cases across the range of severity
of distress and diversity of concerns seen in the whole sample.
Moreover, these patients’ concerns resembled those seen in
previous qualitative reports of cardiac patients’ distress (Jensen
and Petersson, 2003; Andersen et al., 2008; Dekker, 2014).
Qualitative research is necessarily shaped by researchers’ own
perspectives in both data collection and analysis phases. Two
members of the research team, while expert in both MCT and
CBT, have been proponents of MCT. However, by including
authors with experience in using qualitative methods to voice
patients’ own perspectives and challenge idealized theories, and
by adopting an iterative, “disputational” approach to analysis,
we sought to ensure an analysis that was thoroughly tested and
informed from multiple perspectives while being grounded in
patients’ accounts.
CONCLUSIONS
A strength of this study is the combination of inductive and
deductive analysis. By using CBT and MCT as templates through
which to view CR patients’ emotional distress, we have been
able to explore the fit between patients’ distress and these two
therapeutic modalities. The findings help to understand the
limited efficacy of CBT in cardiac patients, and suggest that
MCT might offer a better fit with distress in this population.
Both on scientific grounds, and to reduce the risk of wasting
resources in evaluating interventions that are a poor fit to the
needs of the target population, we suggest that studies such as this
should be prioritized early in the development and evaluation of
psychological interventions, or in the application of interventions
to new populations, before progressing to the stage of RCTs.
Such studies can ensure that RCTs are focused in areas of
the greatest potential benefit to patients. More specifically, our
findings can inform improvements in psychological intervention
in the context of cardiac care. We propose that, rather than
conducting further RCTs of CBT for cardiac patients, evaluations
of potentially more compatible psychological interventions such
as MCT are required.
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